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Abstract
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a gener-
alization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen
as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of solution
is justified in two ways: We prove that correlated solutions arise as limits of ex-
changeable correlated equilibria in restricted (Markov open-loop) strategies for the
underlying N -player games, and we show how to construct approximate N -player
correlated equilibria starting from a correlated solution to the mean field game.
Keywords and phrases: Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, mean field
game, weak convergence, restricted strategy, exchangeability.
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1 Introduction
Correlated equilibria are generalisations of Nash equilibria that allow for correlation
between players’ strategies. In this paper, we consider correlated equilibria for a simple
class of symmetric finite horizon N -player games and their natural mean field game
counterpart as the number of players N goes to infinity.
Mean field games (MFGs, for short), introduced by Huang et al. [2006] and Lasry and Lions
[2007], arise as limit systems for certain symmetric stochastic N -player games with mean
field interaction as the number of players N tends to infinity. Each player interacts
with her competitors only via the empirical distribution of their positions so that, when
N →∞, one expects the empirical distribution to converge to the law of the “represen-
tative player” (Law of Large Numbers or Propagation of Chaos). In the limiting MFG,
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the “representative player” reacts optimally to the behavior of the population, which in
turn should arise at equilibrium by aggregation of all identical players’ best responses.
For a thorough treatment of MFG theory from a probabilistic perspective we refer to the
two-volume book by Carmona and Delarue [2018].
A rigorous connection between MFGs and the underlying N -player games can be es-
tablished in two directions: constructing approximate Nash equilibria for N -player games
starting from a solution to the MFG (for instance, Huang et al. [2006], Carmona and Delarue
[2013], Gomes et al. [2013], to name a few), or by showing convergence of approximate
N -player Nash equilibria to solutions of the MFG, as N →∞. Crucial, especially in the
second direction, is the choice of admissible strategies in the definition of N -player Nash
equilibria. Particularly difficult is the question of convergence in the non-stationary
case when Nash equilibria are considered in closed-loop strategies (Markov feedback
strategies with full state information). A breakthrough in this direction was made in
Cardaliaguet et al. [2019], where convergence of Nash equilibria is established through
the so-called master equation provided the latter is well-posed, an assumption that im-
plies uniqueness of MFG solutions. More recently, in Lacker [2018], a general convergence
result was proved in the non-degenerate diffusion setting, but to weak solutions of the
MFG. For weak MFG solutions, the limiting flow of measures can be stochastic even
without common noise. An important question, converse to the convergence result, is
whether all weak MFG solutions can be obtained as limits of convergent closed-loop N -
player approximate Nash equilibria. The analysis performed in Lacker [2018, Sect. 7]
seems to suggest that this is not always possible. We believe that a way of filling this
gap is to consider a more general concept of solution, such as correlated equilibria.
Correlated equilibria were introduced in two seminal papers by Robert Aumann
[Aumann, 1974, 1987] for many-player games. Aumann’s main idea can be explained
as follows: a mediator or correlation device randomly selects a strategy profile according
to some publicly known distribution, then recommends to each player in private a strat-
egy according to the profile. A probability distribution on the space of strategy profiles
is a correlated equilibrium (CE, for short) if no player has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from the mediator’s recommendation. In case the mediator uses a product prob-
ability distribution, we are back to a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Originally
introduced in the context of static games with complete information by Aumann, the new
notion of CE gave rise to a huge literature in game theory as well as economics along
many directions. We refer to the survey by Forges [2012] on several aspects of the more
general notion of communication equilibrium and extensions of CE to dynamic games,
possibly stochastic and with incomplete information. The important role the concept of
CE plays in game theory and economics can be explained by its many appealing prop-
erties, as compared to Nash equilibria. For instance, higher equilibrium payoffs can be
reached, possibly outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs. The computational
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complexity of CE is generally lower than for Nash equilibria [see Gilboa and Zemel, 1989].
In the evolutionary game theory literature, it has been proved that if all players follow
natural learning procedures then the empirical distribution of their actions converges to
CE distributions [for instance, Hart, 2005]. Moreover, given their interpretation in terms
of mediator’s recommendations, correlated equilibria can be seen as intermediate config-
urations between the two extreme cases of decentralized solutions such as Nash equilibria
on the one hand, and centrally planned optimal solutions that are forced on the players
on the other hand.
Here, we consider correlated equilibria for a simple class of symmetric finite horizon
N -player games and their natural MFG counterpart as N →∞. In the N -player setting,
the state variables evolve in discrete time, both state space and the set of control actions
are finite and, more importantly, the players are allowed to use only restricted strategies,
that is, feedback strategies that depend only on time and the corresponding individual
state variable.
Within this framework, we propose a notion of correlated MFG solution, which we jus-
tify in two ways: by showing the convergence of N -player symmetric CE to a correlated
MFG solution (convergence or forward approximation), and by constructing approximate
CE starting from a correlated solution of the MFG (backward approximation). A corre-
lated MFG solution is a probability distribution over the space of all pairs of strategies
and flows of measures such that (i) the “representative player” has no incentive to deviate
from the mediator’s recommendation; (ii) the flow of measures at any time t equals the
marginal law of the state variable at time t conditioned on the σ-algebra generated by
the whole flow of measures up to the terminal time. The main contributions of the paper
can be shortly described as follows:
• Inspired by the notion of correlated equilibrium in game theory, we propose a new
concept of solution for MFGs, which is justified by the following two approximation
results.
• We prove that any sequence of exchangeable approximate correlated equilibria in
restricted strategies for theN -player games subsequentially converges towards some
correlated MFG solution according to the definition above (forward approximation).
• We also prove the converse, that is, any correlated MFG solution arises as limit
of exchangeable approximate CE in the N -player games as N → ∞ or, in other
terms, any correlated MFG solution can be implemented in a natural way by some
mediator willing to recommend strategies to the players.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation
and basic elements for the objects of our study. In Section 3, we describe the underly-
ing N -player games and give the definition of (approximate) correlated equilibrium in
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restricted strategies. Moreover, we also prove that N -player correlated equilibria exist
in the class of symmetric (or exchangeable) profile distributions. Section 4 is dedicated
to the mean field limit model. There, we give our definition of correlated MFG solution.
In Section 5, we show that symmetric N -player correlated equilibria concentrate, in the
limit as N →∞, on correlated MFG solutions, while Section 6 contains the converse re-
sult, that is, any correlated MFG solution arises as a limit of exchangeable approximate
N -player correlated equilibria as N → ∞. In Appendix A, we collect some auxiliary
results.
2 Preliminaries
For a Polish space S, we denote by P(S) the space of probability measures on B(S), the
Borel sets of S, and endow P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of measures.
Many of the spaces of interest here are simply finite sets. We endow a finite set with the
discrete topology, which makes it a Polish space (a compatible metric being the discrete
metric).
If S is finite, then a metric on P(S) compatible with the weak convergence topology is
given by the following L1-distance, which we indicate by dist when the underlying space
is clear from the context:
dist(m, m˜)
.
=
1
2
∑
x∈S
|m(x)− m˜(x)|, m, m˜ ∈ P(S).
Notice that weak convergence and convergence in total variation coincide for probability
measures over a finite set. If m, m˜ are empirical measures of the same size, that is, if
m = 1
N
∑N
i=1 δsi , m˜ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δs˜i for some si, s˜i ∈ S, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then
(2.1) dist(m, m˜) ≤ min
σ permutation of {1,...,N}
1
N
N∑
i=1
1si 6=s˜σ(i) ≤
1
N
N∑
i=1
1si 6=s˜i .
We consider symmetric dynamic games in discrete time over a finite time horizon
with individual state and action spaces given by finite sets. Admissible strategies will
have Markov feedback form but with information restricted to player’s individual states
(sometimes called “Markov open-loop”). To fix the notation, we choose
• T ∈ N, representing the finite time horizon (with initial time zero);
• non-empty finite sets X and Γ, the set of individual states and control actions,
respectively;
• a measurable function Ψ : {0, . . . , T −1} × X × P(X ) × Γ × Z → X , the system
function, determining the one-step individual state dynamics, where Z
.
= [0, 1] is
the space of noise states;
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• a bounded measurable function f : {0, . . . , T−1}×X ×P(X )×Γ→ R, representing
the running costs;
• a bounded measurable function F : X ×P(X )→ R, representing the terminal costs.
Denote by ν the uniform distribution on the Borel sets of Z = [0, 1]; ν will be the
common distribution of the random variables representing the idiosyncratic noise.
Let R denote the set of Markov feedback strategies over players’ own states (restricted
strategies):
R
.
= {ϕ : {0, . . . , T−1} × X → Γ} .
Notice that R is a finite set; it will hence be endowed with the discrete topology. Let U
denote the set of mappings from R to R:
U
.
= {u : R → R} .
Since R is a finite set, U is finite, too; it will therefore be endowed with the discrete
topology. Any element of U , that is, any function u : R → R (which is automatically
measurable) will be referred to as a strategy modification.
For the N -player game, we have to consider probability measures on strategy vectors
(or strategy profiles). Any such probability measure, that is, any element of P(RN ),
will be called a correlated profile. For the mean field game, we will consider probability
measures on individual strategies times flows of state distributions. Any such probability
measure, that is, any element of P(R×P(X )T+1), will be called a correlated flow.
3 The N-player games
Fix N ∈ N. Choose mN ∈ P(XN ), the joint distribution of the players’ states at time
zero; for instance, mN = ⊗Nm0 for some m0 ∈ P(X ). Let γ
N ∈ P(RN ) be an N -player
correlated profile, and let u ∈ U be a strategy modification.
A tuple ((Ω,F ,P),ΦN1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N ,X
N
1 (.), . . . ,X
N
N (.), ξ
N
1 (.), . . . , ξ
N
N (.)) is called a real-
ization of the triple (mN , γN , u) for player i if ΦN1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N are R-valued random vari-
ables, XNj (t), j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, X -valued random variables, and ξ
N
j (t),
j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are Z-valued random variables all defined on the proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P) such that
(i) P ◦(XN1 (0), . . . ,X
N
N (0))
−1 = mN ;
(ii) P ◦(ΦN1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N )
−1 = γN ;
(iii) ξNj (t), j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) with common distribution P ◦(ξNj (t))
−1 = ν;
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(iv) (ξNj (t))j∈{1,...,N},t∈{1,...,T}, (X
N
j (0))j∈{1,...,N}, and (Φ
N
j )j∈{1,...,N} are independent as
random variables with values in ZN ·T , XN , and RN , respectively;
(v) P-almost surely, for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
XNi (t+ 1) = Ψ
(
t,XNi (t), µ
N
i (t), u ◦Φ
N
i
(
t,XNi (t)
)
, ξNi (t+ 1)
)
,
XNj (t+ 1) = Ψ
(
t,XNj (t), µ
N
j (t),Φ
N
j
(
t,XNj (t)
)
, ξNj (t+ 1)
)
, j 6= i,
where µNl (t) is the empirical measure of the states at time t of all players except
player l:
µNl (t)
.
=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=l
δXNj (t)
, l ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Any realization ((Ω,F ,P),ΦN1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N ,X
N
1 (.), . . . ,X
N
N (.), ξ
N
1 (.), . . . , ξ
N
N (.)) of the triple
(mN , γN , u) for player i can be interpreted in the following way. The random variables
XN1 (0), . . . ,X
N
N (0) represent the initial states of players 1 through N , and their joint
distribution is given by mN . The random variable ΦNl represents the recommendation (or
signal) the mediator sends to player l before the game starts. While the joint distribution
of ΦN1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N , which is equal to γ
N , is common knowledge, no player can directly see
the recommendations received by the others. This feature is made precise in the way the
state dynamics are formulated in (v): Player i, the player who might deviate, chooses
a strategy by modifying the recommendation ΦNi through the application of a mapping
u : R → R, while the other players follow the recommendation they receive from the
mediator. Player i thus uses the random strategy u ◦ΦNi instead of simply Φ
N
i . Clearly,
u ◦ ΦNi is σ(Φ
N
i )-measurable.
Remark 3.1. The independence assumption in (iv) is crucial. Clearly, the vector (ξNj (t))
of noise variables and the vector (XNj (0)) of initial states have to be independent. But
we also require them to be independent of the vector (ΦNj ) of recommendation variables.
This makes precise the idea that the mediator gives recommendations to the players
before the game starts. Recall that what the mediator suggests are feedback strategies.
If player j accepts the mediator’s recommendation, then, given a scenario ω ∈ Ω, he
will use the feedback strategy ΦNj (ω). In view of the dynamics according to (v), he will
therefore select, at any time t, the control action ΦNj (ω)(t,X
N
j (t, ω)). The control action
at time t is thus in general not independent of the noise variables up to time t, nor is it
independent of the initial states. An analogous observation holds for player i, who might
modify the mediator’s recommendation.
The costs for player i associated with initial distribution mN , correlated profile γN ,
and a strategy modification u are given by
JNi
(
m
N , γN , u
) .
= E
[
T−1∑
t=0
f
(
t,XNi (t), µ
N
i (t), u ◦Φ
N
i
(
t,XNi (t)
))
+ F
(
XNi (T ), µ
N
i (T )
)]
,
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where the expected value on the right-hand side above is computed with respect to any
realization of the triple (mN , γN , u) for player i. Thanks to the independence assumption
(iv), the costs are well defined in that they do not depend on the choice of the realization.
Definition 3.1. Let ε ≥ 0. A correlated profile γN ∈ P(RN ) is called an ε-correlated
equilibrium in restricted strategies with initial distribution m if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
every strategy modification u ∈ U ,
JNi (m
N , γN , Id) ≤ JNi (m
N , γN , u) + ε.
When ε = 0, we say that γN is a correlated equilibrium in restricted strategies.
An ε-correlated equilibrium is called symmetric if it is symmetric as a probability
measure on RN (i.e. invariant under permutations of the components).
Remark 3.2. Nash equilibria are particular cases of correlated equilibria. According to
Definition 3.1, a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies corresponds to a correlated profile
γN that has product form, while a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies corresponds to a
correlated profile which is the product of Dirac measures concentrated in the strategies
of the Nash profile.
Next, we prove that there always exists a symmetric correlated equilibrium for the
N -player game. To this end, we adapt the existence proof in Hart and Schmeidler [1989]
to our specific setting.
Proposition 3.1. Let mN ∈ P(XN ) be exchangeable. Then there exists a symmetric
correlated equilibrium with initial distribution mN .
Proof. By symmetry, we can concentrate on modifications of player one only. Let us
consider the following auxiliary two-player zero-sum game: player I (the maximizer)
chooses any symmetric mixed strategy γ ∈ P(RN ), while player II (the minimizer)
chooses a mixed strategy θ ∈ P(U), where U is the set of all modifications u : R → R.
The payoff player II pays to player I is given by
(3.1)
∑
ϕ∈RN
γ(ϕ)
∑
u∈U
θ(u)
(
JN1 (m
N , δϕ, u)− J
N
1 (m
N , δϕ, Id)
)
.
A symmetric CE corresponds to a symmetric strategy for player I that gives a non-
negative payoff for any player II strategy. Indeed, in this case player one in the original
N -player game has no incentive to deviate unilaterally in the sense of Definition 3.1.
By the symmetry of γ and of the N -player game, the same is true for any other player
i ∈ {2, . . . , N}. This is due to the fact that if γ is a symmetric measure over RN , then
the expression (3.1) stays the same when JN1 is replaced with J
N
i for i ∈ {2, . . . , N}.
7
Since the modification u acts only on the strategy ϕ1 of player one, in the sequel we
will make a little abuse of notation and set
JN1 (m
N , δ(u◦ϕ1,ϕ−1))
.
= JN1 (m
N , δϕ, u).
Consistently, we will also write JN1 (m
N , δϕ) for J
N
1 (m
N , δϕ, Id), with ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ
−1).
Now, observe that the set Psym(RN ) of all symmetric elements of P(RN ) is convex
and compact. Hence, since the payoff (3.1) is bilinear, we can apply the von Neumann
Minimax Theorem so that it suffices to prove that for all player II strategies θ there
exists some player I symmetric strategy γ granting a non-negative payoff.
In order to obtain the above property, we can proceed as in Hart and Schmeidler
[1989]. In particular, we use Lemma 1 therein, which we recall for the reader’s conve-
nience:
Lemma 3.1. [Hart and Schmeidler [1989, Lemma 1]] Let M ∈ N. Let a = (ajk)
M
j,k=1
be a matrix of non-negative numbers. Then there exists a probability vector x = (xj)
M
j=1
such that, for any vector v = (vj)
M
j=1,
M∑
j=1
xj
M∑
k=1
ajk(vj − vk) = 0.
Let θ ∈ P(U) be an arbitrary strategy of player II. We re-parameterize the payoff
(3.1). To this end, for (ϕ1, ϕ
′
1) ∈ R
2, set
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
.
=
∑
u∈U :u◦ϕ1=ϕ′1
θ(u).
Apply Lemma 3.1 withM
.
= #R, matrix a
.
=
(
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
)
(ϕ1,ϕ′1)∈R
2
, and vectors v ∈ RM
of the form
v =
(
−JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
)
ϕ1∈R
,
where ϕ−1 ∈ RN−1 is arbitrary. Then there exists a probability vector (γ1(ϕ1))ϕ1∈R in
P(R) (depending only on θ) such that
(3.2)
∑
ϕ1∈R
γ1(ϕ1)
∑
ϕ′1∈R
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
(
JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ′1,ϕ−1))− J
N
1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
)
= 0
for all ϕ−1 ∈ RN−1.
Now, define γ ∈ Psym(RN ) by γ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕN )
.
=
∏N
j=1 γ1(ϕj). It remains to check
that under the correlated profile γ the expression in (3.1) is zero so that γ is a symmetric
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CE for the N -player game. This can be done exactly as in Hart and Schmeidler [1989].
Nonetheless, we give the details for the sake of completeness. By definition of γ, we have∑
ϕ∈RN
γ(ϕ)
∑
ϕ′1∈R
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
(
JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ′1,ϕ−1))− J
N
1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
)
=
∑
ϕ
( N∏
j=1
γ1(ϕj)
)∑
ϕ′1
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
(
JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ′1,ϕ−1))− J
N
1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
)
=
∑
ϕ−1,ϕ1
(∏
j 6=1
γ1(ϕj)
)
γ1(ϕ1)
∑
ϕ′1
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
(
JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ′1,ϕ−1))− J
N
1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
)
=
∑
ϕ−1
(∏
j 6=1
γ1(ϕj)
)
·

∑
ϕ1
γ1(ϕ1)
∑
ϕ′1
θ˜(ϕ1, ϕ
′
1)
(
JN1 (m
N , δ(ϕ′1,ϕ−1))− J
N
1 (m
N , δ(ϕ1,ϕ−1))
) ,
which vanishes as the expression within square brackets is zero due to (3.2).
4 The mean field game
Choose m0 ∈ P(X ), the distribution of the representative player’s state at time zero. Let
ρ ∈ P(R×P(X )T+1) be a correlated flow, and let u ∈ U be a strategy modification.
A tuple ((Ω,F ,P),Φ,X(.), µ(.), ξ(.)) is called a realization of the triple (m0, ρ, u)
if Φ is an R-valued random variable, X(0), . . . ,X(T ) are X -valued random variables,
µ(0), . . . , µ(T ) are P(X )-valued random variables, and ξ(1), . . . , ξ(T ) are Z-valued ran-
dom variables all defined on a common probability space (Ω,F ,P) such that
(i) P ◦(X(0))−1 = m0;
(ii) P ◦(Φ, µ(0), . . . , µ(T ))−1 = ρ;
(iii) ξ(t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are i.i.d. with common distribution P ◦(ξ(t))−1 = ν;
(iv) ξ(.), X(0), and (Φ, µ(.)) are independent as random variables with values in ZT ,
X , and R×P(X )T+1, respectively;
(v) P-almost surely, for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
(4.1) X(t+ 1) = Ψ (t,X(t), µ(t), u ◦ Φ (t,X(t)) , ξ(t+ 1)) .
Recalling the heuristic connection between N -player games and mean field game, we
can interpret a realization ((Ω,F ,P),Φ,X(.), µ(.), ξ(.)) of the triple (m0, ρ, u) as follows.
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The random variable Φ represents the recommendation that one representative player
receives from the mediator, whereas X(.) gives the representative player’s state sequence,
which is recursively determined through Eq. (4.1). There, ξ(t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are the
noise variables, while µ(.) represents a stochastic flow of measures.
Remark 4.1. The flow of measures µ(.) should be thought of as a limit point of the
N -player flows of empirical measures. As such, it will in general be stochastic and not
independent of the recommendation variable Φ, which in turn should be thought of as
a limit point of the recommendation variables for one fixed player, say the first, in the
N -player games. It is therefore necessary to prescribe the joint distribution of Φ and µ,
as done in (ii) through the correlated flow ρ. Similarly, in (iv), which should be compared
to the independence assumption (iv) of the N -player games, we require independence of
ξ(.), X(0), and (Φ, µ(.)), not just of ξ(.), X(0), and Φ. We stress that in general Φ and
µ will not be independent.
The costs for a representative player associated with initial distribution m0, correlated
flow ρ, and a strategy modification u : R→ R are given by
J(m0, ρ, u)
.
= E
[
T−1∑
t=0
f (t,X(t), µ(t), u ◦Φ (t,X(t))) + F (X(T ), µ(T ))
]
,
where the expected value on the right-hand side above is computed with respect to any
realization of (m0, ρ, u). Thanks to (iv), any two realizations of (m0, ρ, u) generate the
same expected value. The cost functional J is thus well defined.
Definition 4.1. A correlated flow ρ ∈ P(R×P(X )T+1) is called a correlated solution of
the mean field game in restricted strategies with initial distribution m0 if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) Optimality: For every strategy modification u ∈ U ,
J(m0; ρ, Id) ≤ J(m0; ρ, u).
(ii) Consistency: If ((Ω,F ,P),Φ,X(.), µ(.), ξ(.)) is a realization of the triple (m0, ρ, Id),
then for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
µ(t)(·) = P (X(t) ∈ · | Fµ) ,
where Fµ
.
= σ(µ) = σ(µ(s) : s ∈ {0, . . . , T}).
The consistency condition in Definition 4.1 is to be understood in the sense that µ(t)
is a regular conditional distribution of X(t) given Fµ. Notice that Fµ is the σ-algebra
generated by the entire flow of measures µ, up to terminal time T .
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Remark 4.2. Definition 4.1 should be compared to the definition of weak MFG solution,
more precisely weak semi-Markov mean field equilibrium, given in Lacker [2018, Defini-
tion 2.5]. An obvious difference lies in the dynamics: While Lacker works with controlled
Itô diffusions driven by non-degenerate additive Wiener noise (as here, idiosyncratic, no
common noise), here we consider simple discrete time dynamics with finite state and
control space. Conceptually more important is the fact that the admissible strategies
here are restricted to functions that depend only on time and the player’s current state,
while Lacker allows for an additional dependence on the flow of measures up to current
time. Notice that the flow of measures may be stochastic in both cases. Clearly, there
is no mediator or correlation device in Lacker [2018]. If in our situation we take the
recommendation variable to be (almost surely) constant, hence with Dirac distribution,
then the optimality condition in Definition 4.1 above can be seen to be analogous to the
optimality condition in Lacker’s definition (point (5) there). His consistency condition
(point (6) there) is apparently different in that the conditional distribution is taken with
respect to the σ-algebra generated by the flow of measures up to current time, not up to
terminal time as in our definition. However, if the recommendation variable is (almost
surely) constant, or absent as in Lacker’s work, then the two ways of conditioning lead
to equivalent consistency conditions, thanks to the (semi-)Markov property of the state
process. In this way, and under the simplifying assumptions made here, one can interpret
weak MFG solutions as a special case of correlated solutions.
5 Convergence of correlated equilibria
For N ∈ N, let mN ∈ P(XN ), let γN ∈ P(RN ) be a strategy profile, and let (εN )N∈N ⊂
[0,∞). Moreover, let m0 ∈ P(X ). We make the following assumptions:
(A1) Continuity property of the system function Ψ: There exists a measurable function
w : [0,∞) → [0, 1] with w(s) → 0 as s → 0+ such that for every (t, x, a) ∈
{0, . . . , T − 1} × X × Γ, all m, m˜ ∈ P(X ),∫
Z
1Ψ(t,x,m,a,z)6=Ψ(t,x,m˜,a,z)ν(dz) ≤ w
(
dist(m, m˜)
)
.
Moreover, for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, every τ ∈ P(X × P(X ) × Γ), Ψ(t, .) is
τ ⊗ ν-almost everywhere continuous.
(A2) The cost coefficients f , F are continuous.
(A3) For every N ∈ N, γN is a symmetric εN -correlated equilibrium in restricted strate-
gies with initial distribution mN .
(A4) The sequence (εN )N∈N converges to zero as N →∞.
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(A5) Initial distributions: mN = ⊗Nm0,N where m0,N → m0 as N →∞.
Remark 5.1. The continuity property (A1) is satisfied, for instance, if Ψ is defined as
follows. Choose L > 0, let d
.
= |X | be the number of states, and let σ : {1, . . . , d} → X
be a bijection. For (t, x, a) ∈ {0, . . . , T −1}×X ×Γ, choose functions a1,t,x,a, . . . , ad,t,x,a :
P(X ) → [0, 1] that are L-Lipschitz continuous and such that
∑d
i=1 ai,t,x,a = 1. Now set
Ψ(t, x,m, a, z)
.
= σ
(
argmin
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , d} :
j∑
i=1
ai,t,x,a(m) ≥ z
})
,
(t, x,m, a, z) ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} × X × P(X ) × Γ×Z.
Recall that ν indicates the uniform distribution on Z = [0, 1]. With the above definition
of Ψ, we have for all m, m˜ ∈ P(X ),
∫
Z
1Ψ(t,x,m,a,z)6=Ψ(t,x,m˜,a,z)ν(dz) ≤
d−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
i=1
ai,t,x,a(m)−
j∑
i=1
ai,t,x,a(m˜)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ L
d(d− 1)
2
dist(m, m˜).
The first part of (A1) is thus satisfied with w(s) = Ld(d−1)2 s. This modulus of continuity
changes if the functions a1,t,x,a, . . . , ad,t,x,a are (uniformly) continuous, but not Lipschitz.
In order to check the second part of (A1), fix t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and let Dt denote the
set of points of discontinuity of Ψ(t, .). By construction, the functions a1,t,x,a, . . . , ad,t,x,a
are continuous on P(X ), and they depend continuously also on x, a since X , Γ are finite
sets. In view of the definition of Ψ, it follows that
Dt ⊆
d⋃
j=1
{
(x,m, a, z) ∈ X × P(X )× Γ×Z :
j∑
i=1
ai,t,x,a(m) = z
}
.
The assertion of the second part of (A1) is now a consequence of Fubini’s theorem as ν
assigns measure zero to any finite subset of Z.
For N ∈ N \ {1}, let
(
(ΩN ,FN ,PN ),Φ
N
1 , . . . ,Φ
N
N ,X
N
1 (.), . . . ,X
N
N (.), ξ
N
1 (.), . . . , ξ
N
N (.)
)
be a realization of the triple (mN , γN , Id), and set
ρN
.
= PN ◦
(
ΦN1 , µ
N
1 (0), . . . , µ
N
1 (T )
)−1
,
where µN1 (t) =
1
N−1
∑N
j=2 δXNj (t)
, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, as above. We then have the following
convergence result:
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Theorem 5.1. Grant (A1) – (A5). Then (ρN )N∈N is relatively compact as a subset of
P(R×P(X )T+1), and any limit point is a correlated solution of the mean field game in
restricted strategies with initial distribution m0.
Proof. If S is a compact Polish space, then P(S) is compact with respect to the topology
of weak convergence of measures. Since X , R are finite sets, hence compact Polish spaces
under the discrete topology, we have that P(R × P(X )T+1) is compact. This in turn
implies the relative compactness of (ρN )N∈N in P(R×P(X )
T+1).
In order to identify the limit points of (ρN )N∈N, set
ηN
.
= PN ◦
(
ΦN1 ,X
N
1 (0), . . . ,X
N
1 (T ), ξ
N
1 (1), . . . , ξ
N
1 (T ), µ
N
1 (0), . . . , µ
N
1 (T )
)−1
.
Clearly, ρN coincides with the image (push forward) measure of ηN under the natural
projection R×X T+1×ZT ×P(X )T+1 → R×P(X )T+1. Moreover, (ηN )N∈N is relatively
compact in P(R×X T+1 ×ZT ×P(X )T+1) since the space R×X T+1 ×ZT ×P(X )T+1
is compact, too. To identify the limit points of (ρN )N∈N it is therefore enough to char-
acterize the limits of convergent subsequences of (ηN )N∈N. We will proceed in several
steps.
Step One. Let (ηNk)k∈N be any convergent subsequence of (η
N )N∈N, and denote its
limit by η. Let (Φ,X(.), ξ(.), µ(.)) be a R × X T+1 × ZT × P(X )T+1-valued random
element on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) such that
η = P ◦ (Φ,X(0), . . . ,X(T ), ξ(1), . . . , ξ(T ), µ(0), . . . , µ(T ))−1 .
Set
ρ
.
= P ◦ (Φ, µ(0), . . . , µ(T ))−1 .
Then the following properties hold:
(a) P ◦(X(0))−1 = m0;
(b) ξ(t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are i.i.d. with common distribution ν;
(c) ξ(.), X(0), and (Φ, µ(.)) are independent;
(d) P-almost surely, for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
X(t+ 1) = Ψ (t,X(t), µ(t),Φ(t,X(t)), ξ(t + 1)) ;
(e) limk→∞ J
Nk
1
(
m
Nk ; γNk , Id
)
= J(m0; ρ, Id).
Point (a) is a consequence of assumption (A5). Point (b) follows from the corre-
sponding independence properties of ξN1 (t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, X
N
1 (0), Φ
N
1 , and their joint
convergence in distribution.
Points (c) and (d) will be established in the next two steps. The convergence of costs
according to (e) is again a consequence of convergence in distribution in conjunction with
assumption (A2).
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Step Two. Let u : R → R be any strategy modification. For N ∈ N \ {1}, define
X -valued random variables X˜Nj (t), j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, on (ΩN ,FN ,PN )
recursively through
X˜Ni (0)
.
= XNi (0) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
X˜N1 (t+ 1)
.
= Ψ
(
t, X˜N1 (t), µ˜
N
1 (t), u ◦ Φ
N
1
(
t, X˜N1 (t)
)
, ξN1 (t+ 1)
)
,
X˜Nj (t+ 1) = Ψ
(
t, X˜Nj (t), µ˜
N
j (t),Φ
N
j
(
t, X˜Nj (t)
)
, ξNj (t+ 1)
)
, j 6= 1,
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
where
µ˜Ni (t)
.
=
1
N − 1
∑
l 6=i
δX˜N
l
(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Set
η˜N
.
= PN ◦
(
ΦN1 , X˜
N
1 (0), . . . , X˜
N
1 (T ), ξ
N
1 (1), . . . , ξ
N
1 (T ), µ˜
N
1 (0), . . . , µ˜
N
1 (T )
)−1
.
Reasoning as in Step One, we have that (η˜N )N∈N is relatively compact in P(R×X
T+1×
ZT × P(X )T+1), and so is (η˜Nk)k∈N. Choose any convergent subsequence of (η˜
Nk)k∈N,
which we continue to indicate by (η˜Nk)k∈N, thus omitting the sub-subscript. Denote its
limit by η˜, and let (Φ˜, X˜(.), ξ˜(.), µ˜(.)) be a R× X T+1 × ZT × P(X )T+1-valued random
element on some probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) such that
η˜ = P˜ ◦
(
Φ˜, X˜(0), . . . , X˜(T ), ξ˜(1), . . . , ξ˜(T ), µ˜(0), . . . , µ˜(T )
)−1
.
Set
ρ˜
.
= P˜ ◦
(
Φ˜, µ˜(0), . . . , µ˜(T )
)−1
.
Then the following properties hold:
(a) P ◦(X˜(0))−1 = m0;
(b) ξ˜(t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are i.i.d. with common distribution ν;
(c) ξ˜(.), X˜(0), and (Φ˜, µ˜(.)) are independent;
(d) P˜-almost surely, for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
X˜(t+ 1) = Ψ
(
t, X˜(t), µ˜(t), u ◦ Φ˜(t, X˜(t)), ξ˜(t+ 1)
)
;
(e) limk→∞ J
Nk
1
(
m
Nk ; γNk , u
)
= J(m0; ρ˜, u).
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Points (a), (b), and (e) follow as in Step One. The independence property (c) will be
established in Step Three. To verify Property (d), define functions Gt : R×X ×P(X )×
Z → X , t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, by setting
Gt(ϕ, x,m, z)
.
= Ψ
(
t, x,m, u(ϕ)(t, x), z
)
.
The function Gt is σ⊗ν-almost everywhere continuous given any measure σ ∈ P(R×X×
P(X )). This follows from the second part of assumption (A1) and the fact that the spaces
R and X are finite. In particular, the mapping R×X → Γ given by (ϕ, x) 7→ ϕ(t, x) is
continuous for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T−1}. Property (d) is now a consequence of Lemma A.1,
the almost everywhere continuity of Gt in conjunction with the independence properties
(b) and (c), and the convergence in distribution of(
X˜
Nk
1 (t+ 1),
(
ΦNk1 , X˜
Nk
1 (t), µ˜
Nk
1 (t), ξ
Nk
1 (t+ 1)
))
to (
X˜(t+ 1),
(
Φ˜, X˜(t), µ˜(t), ξ˜(t+ 1)
))
as k →∞, by the mapping theorem.
Point (e) above, together with the corresponding property established in Step One,
entails thanks to assumptions (A3) and (A4) that
J(m0; ρ, Id) ≤ J(m0; ρ˜, u).
It remains to show that ρ = ρ˜ and that property (c) holds.
Step Three. For N ∈ N \ {1}, recursively define X -valued random variables XˆNj (t),
j ∈ {2, . . . , N}, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, on (ΩN ,FN ,PN ) through
XˆNj (0)
.
= XNj (0) for every j ∈ {2, . . . , N},
XˆNj (t+ 1) = Ψ
(
t, XˆNj (t), µˆ
N
1 (t),Φ
N
j
(
t, XˆNj (t)
)
, ξNj (t+ 1)
)
, j 6= 1,
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
where
µˆN1 (t)
.
=
1
N − 1
N∑
l=2
δ
XˆN
l
(t).
Let dist be the metric on P(X ) introduced in Section 2. We claim that for every
t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
(5.1)
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
PN
(
XˆNj (t) 6= X˜
N
j (t)
)
N→∞
−→ 0.
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We verify (5.1) by induction over t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. First notice that, by inequality (2.1),
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, including j = 1, all t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
(5.2) EN
[
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
j (t)
)]
≤
1
N − 1
+
1
N − 1
N∑
l=2
PN
(
XˆNl (t) 6= X˜
N
l (t)
)
.
It is clear that relation (5.1) holds if t = 0, since XˆNj (0) = X˜
N
j (0) = X
N
j (0) for all
j ∈ {2, . . . , N}. Now, suppose that (5.1) holds for some t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. For each
j ∈ {2, . . . , N}, we have
PN
(
XˆNj (t+ 1) 6= X˜
N
j (t+ 1)
)
≤ PN
(
XˆNj (t) 6= X˜
N
j (t)
)
+EN
[
1Ψ(t,XˆNj (t),µˆN1 (t),ΦNj (t,XˆNj (t)),ξNj (t+1)) 6=Ψ(t,XˆNj (t),µ˜Nj (t),ΦNj (t,XˆNj (t)),ξNj (t+1))
]
.
Using the Fubini-Tonelli theorem, the independence of ξNj (t+ 1), as well as assumption
(A1), we find the expected value in the display above to be less than or equal to
EN
[∫
Z
1Ψ(t,XˆNj (t),µˆN1 (t),ΦNj (t,XˆNj (t)),z)6=Ψ(t,XˆNj (t),µ˜Nj (t),ΦNj (t,XˆNj (t)),z)
ν(dz)
]
≤ EN
[
w
(
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
j (t)
))]
.
The induction hypothesis and (5.2) imply that
max
j∈{2,...,N}
EN
[
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
j (t)
)] N→∞
−→ 0.
This in turn entails, by Markov’s inequality and the fact that w is bounded non-negative
with w(s)→ 0 as s→ 0+, that
max
j∈{2,...,N}
EN
[
w
(
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
j (t)
))] N→∞
−→ 0.
Using again the induction hypothesis, we find that
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
PN
(
XˆNj (t+ 1) 6= X˜
N
j (t+ 1)
)
≤
1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
PN
(
XˆNj (t) 6= X˜
N
j (t)
)
+ max
j∈{2,...,N}
EN
[
w
(
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
j (t)
))] N→∞
−→ 0.
This establishes (5.1) for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
As a consequence of (5.1) and (5.2), we obtain
EN
[
T∑
t=0
dist
(
µˆN1 (t), µ˜
N
1 (t)
)] N→∞
−→ 0.
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By Lemma A.2, this implies that the sequences
(ΦNk1 , X˜
Nk
1 (.), ξ
Nk
1 (.), µ˜
Nk
1 (.)), and (Φ
Nk
1 , X˜
Nk
1 (.), ξ
Nk
1 (.), µˆ
Nk
1 (.))
have the same limit in distribution, namely (Φ˜, X˜(.), ξ˜(.), µ˜(.)). The definition of µˆN1 (.)
through the random variables XˆNj (t), with j ≥ 2, does not depend on the strategy
modification u. Thus, also (ΦNk1 ,X
Nk
1 (.), ξ
Nk
1 (.), µ
Nk
1 (.)) and (Φ
Nk
1 ,X
Nk
1 (.), ξ
Nk
1 (.), µˆ
Nk
1 (.))
have the same limit in distribution, namely (Φ,X(.), ξ(.), µ(.)). Since XN1 (0) = X˜
N
1 (0)
for every N ∈ N, we find that
P ◦ (Φ,X(0), ξ(.), µ(.))−1 = P˜ ◦
(
Φ˜, X˜(0), ξ˜(.), µ˜(.)
)−1
.
This implies, in particular, that ρ = ρ˜. In addition, by construction of µˆN1 (.), the
independence of XN1 (0), . . . ,X
N
N (0) according to (A5), and the independence of X
N
j (0),
ξNj (.), Φ
N
j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have that
XN1 (0), ξ
N
1 (.), and (Φ
N
1 , µˆ
N
1 ) are independent, for every N ∈ N.
Convergence in distribution now yields property (c). Thanks to Step Two, it follows that
J(m0; ρ, Id) ≤ J(m0; ρ, u).
The optimality condition of Definition 4.1 is therefore satisfied.
Step Four. We verify the consistency condition in Definition 4.1. For N ∈ N, let µN (t)
denote the empirical measure of the states at time t ∈ {0, . . . , T} of all players in the
N -player game, and let µN denote the empirical measure of their state trajectories:
µN (t)
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXNi (t)
, µN
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(XNi (0),...,X
N
i (T ))
.
Thus, µN (t) is a P(X )-valued random variable, for every t, while µN is a P(X T+1)-valued
random variable.
As a consequence of the symmetry of the correlated profiles according to (A3),
of the initial distributions according to (A5), and of the dynamics, we obtain that
(XN1 (t), . . . ,X
N
N (t)) is a finite exchangeable sequence of X -valued random variables for
every t, while (XN1 (.), . . . ,X
N
N (.)) is a finite exchangeable sequence of X
T+1-valued ran-
dom variables. Lemma A.5 now yields the conditional distributions of the state and of
the state trajectory of player one given the corresponding empirical measure:
PN
(
XN1 (t) ∈ . | µ
N (t)
)
= µN (t)(.), t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
PN
(
(XN1 (0), . . . ,X
N
1 (T )) ∈ . | µ
N
)
= µN (.).
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Applying the conditional distribution of the state trajectory of player one to sets of the
form X t ×B × X T−t shows that also
PN
(
XN1 (t) ∈ . | µ
N
)
= µN (t)(.) for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
The σ-algebra generated by µN (.) = (µN (0), . . . , µN (T )), the flow of empirical measures,
is contained in σ(µN ), while it contains σ(µN (t)) for every t. In view of Lemma A.4, we
thus find that
PN
(
XN1 (t) ∈ . | (µ
N (0), . . . , µN (T ))
)
= µN (t)(.) for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
According to Step One (using the mapping theorem), we have that, for every t ∈
{0, . . . , T}, the random vector (XNk1 (t), (µ
Nk
1 (0), . . . , µ
Nk
1 (T )), µ
Nk
1 (t)) converges in distri-
bution to (X(t), (µ(0), . . . , µ(T )), µ(t)) as k →∞. Now, for every k ∈ N, every ω ∈ ΩNk ,
every t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
dist
(
µ
Nk
1,ω(t), µ
Nk
ω (t)
)
≤ (Nk − 1)
(
1
Nk − 1
−
1
Nk
)
+
1
Nk
=
2
Nk
,
where dist is the metric on P(X ) introduced in Section 2. This implies by Lemma A.2
that also the vector (XNk1 (t), (µ
Nk(0), . . . , µNk(T )), µNk (t)) converges in distribution to
(X(t), (µ(0), . . . , µ(T )), µ(t)) as k → ∞. By Lemma A.3, we now find the conditional
distribution of X(t) given the flow of measures (µ(0), . . . , µ(T )):
P (X(t) ∈ . | (µ(0), . . . , µ(T ))) = µ(t)(.) for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
which yields the consistency condition.
6 Approximate N-player correlated equilibria
The next result shows how to construct a sequence of approximate N -player correlated
equilibria with approximation error tending to zero as N → ∞ provided we have a
correlated solution to the mean field game. The construction can be roughly described
as follows: first, the mediator draws some flow of measures from the second marginal of
the correlated solution and second, conditioning on such a flow, he draws a sequence of
i.i.d. recommendations that are privately communicated to the players in the N -player
games.
In order to rigorously state the result, let m0 ∈ P(X ), and let (m
N )N∈N be such that
assumption (A5) holds: mN = ⊗Nm0,N with m0,N → m0 as N →∞.
Theorem 6.1. Grant (A1) and (A2). Suppose that ρ ∈ P(R×P(X )T+1) is a correlated
solution of the mean field game with initial distribution m0. For N ∈ N, define γ
N ∈
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P(RN ) through
γN (C1 × . . .× CN )
.
=
∫
P(X )T+1
N∏
i=1
ρ1(Ci |m) ρ2(dm),
where ρ has been factorized according to
ρ(C ×B) =
∫
B
ρ1(C |m)ρ2(dm), C ⊆ R, B ∈ ⊗
T+1B(P(X )).
Then there exists a sequence (εN )N∈N ⊂ [0,∞) such that γ
N is an εN -correlated equilib-
rium with initial distribution mN , for every N , and εN → 0 as N →∞.
Proof. By symmetry, we may restrict attention to strategy modifications of player one.
For N ∈ N, set
εN
.
= JN1 (m
N ; γN , Id)− inf
u∈U
JN1 (m
N ; γN , u).
Then γN is an εN -correlated equilibrium with initial distribution m
N . It remains to show
that εN → 0 as N → ∞. To this end, choose a sequence of strategy modifications u
N
such that
JN1 (m
N ; γN , uN ) ≤ inf
u∈U
JN1 (m
N ; γN , u) +
1
N
.
We have to show that limN→∞ J
N
1 (m
N ; γN , Id) = J(m0; ρ, Id) and that
lim inf
N→∞
JN1 (m
N ; γN , uN ) ≥ J(m0; ρ, Id),
as this entails that εN → 0 as N →∞.
In our setting, the set of strategy modifications, i.e. of mappings u : R→ R, is finite
since R is finite. Therefore and by the optimality condition, the above limit inferior
will be established as soon as lim infN→∞ J
N
1 (m
N ; γN , u) ≥ J(m0; ρ, u) for every strategy
modification u. It is therefore enough to show that
(6.1) lim
N→∞
JN1 (m
N ; γN , u) = J(m0; ρ, u) for every u ∈ U .
We proceed in three steps.
Step One. For N ∈ N, set
γNm
.
= ⊗Nρ1(. |m), m ∈ P(X )
T+1.
Then, for every strategy modification u ∈ U ,
JN1 (m
N ; γN , u) =
∫
P(X )T+1
JN1 (m
N ; γNm , u)ρ2(dm),
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and also
J(m0; ρ, u) =
∫
P(X )T+1
J(m0; ρ1(· |m)⊗ δm, u)ρ2(dm).
To see this, recall that if we have a realization of (mN , γN , u) for player one in the N -
player game or of (m0, ρ, u) in the mean field game, then the sequence of noise variables,
the initial states (or state), and the random elements realizing the correlated profile γN
(or the correlated flow ρ) are independent.
Step Two. Fix a strategy modification u. Let m ∈ P(X )T+1. As in the proof of The-
orem 5.1, let (Φm,Xm(.), ξ(.), µm(.)) and (Φ˜m, X˜m(.), ξ˜(.), µ˜m(.)) be the distributional
limit along a convergent subsequence of realizations of (mN , γNm , Id) and (m
N , γNm , u),
respectively. Then properties (a)–(e) there hold, for both (Φm,Xm(.), ξ(.), µm(.)) and
(Φ˜m, X˜m(.), ξ˜(.), µ˜m(.)). By construction and Step Three in the proof of Theorem 5.1,
we also have
Pm ◦ (Φm,Xm(0), ξ(.), µm(.))
−1 = P˜m ◦
(
Φ˜m, X˜m(0), ξ˜(.), µ˜m(.)
)−1
and Pm ◦Φ
−1
m = P˜m ◦ Φ˜
−1
m = ρ1(. |m). Moreover, by (A1), (A5) and thanks to the fact
that γNm is the N -fold product of ρ1(. |m), propagation of chaos holds for the convergent
subsequence corresponding to (mN , γNm , Id) in the sense that
Pm ◦ (Xm(t), µm(t))
−1 = mˆm(t)⊗ δmˆm(t), t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
for some deterministic flow of measures mˆm ∈ P(X )
T+1 with mˆm(0) = m0; see, for
instance, Theorem 4.2 in Gottlieb [1998]. In view of property (d), we therefore have
Pm-almost surely,
Xm(t+ 1) = Ψ (t,Xm(t), mˆm(t),Φm(t,Xm(t)), ξ(t + 1)) ,
Pm ◦Xm(t)
−1 = mˆm(t), t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}.
(6.2)
Using the independence properties (b) and (c), we see by induction over the time variable
t that Equation (6.2), together with the initial distribution Pm ◦Xm(0)
−1 = m0 and
the distribution Pm ◦Φ
−1
m = ρ1(. |m), uniquely determines the (deterministic) flow of
measures mˆm. This can be seen as a uniqueness property for a kind of McKean-Vlasov
equation.
Step Three. We are going to show that mˆm = m for ρ2-almost every m ∈ P(X )
T+1,
where mˆm is the deterministic flow of measures identified in Step Two.
Let ((Ω,F ,P∗),Φ∗,X∗(.), µ∗(.), ξ∗(.)) be a realization of the triple (m0, ρ, Id). The
quintuple thus satisfies the dynamics given by Eq. (4.1), that is, P∗-almost surely, for
every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
X∗(t+ 1) = Ψ (t,X∗(t), µ∗(t),Φ∗(t,X∗(t)), ξ∗(t+ 1)) .
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Moreover, P∗ ◦(Φ∗, µ∗(0), . . . , µ∗(T ))−1 = ρ and P∗ ◦(X∗(0))−1 = m0. By hypothesis, ρ
is a correlated solution with initial distribution m0. In view of the consistency property,
conditioning on µ∗ therefore yields for ρ2-almost every m ∈ P(X )
T+1,
P
∗ (X∗(t) ∈ . | µ∗ = m) = m(t)(.), t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
P
∗ (Φ∗ ∈ . | µ∗ = m) = ρ1(. |m).
Since the noise variables ξ∗(t), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, are i.i.d. with common distribution ν
and ξ∗(.), X∗(0), and (Φ∗, µ∗(.)) are independent, it follows that for ρ2-almost every
flow m ∈ P(X )T+1, the triple (X∗(.),Φ∗, ξ∗(.)) solves Equation (6.2) P∗ (. | µ∗ = m)-
almost surely with deterministic flow of measures mˆm = m. Uniqueness of solutions for
Equation (6.2) now entails that
mˆm = m and Pm ◦ (Φm, µm)
−1 = P˜m ◦
(
Φ˜m, µ˜m
)−1
= ρ1(·|m) ⊗ δm
for ρ2-almost every m ∈ P(X )
T+1. This also shows that, given a (ρ2-typical) flow of
measures m ∈ P(X )T+1, any convergent subsequence of realizations of (mN , γNm , Id) has
the same limit in distribution, and analogously for realizations of (mN ; γNm , u).
Convergence of costs according to property (e) and integration against ρ2 according
to Step One, in conjunction with dominated convergence, finish the proof.
A Auxiliary results
Here, we collect some auxiliary results, mostly elementary, regarding weak convergence
and exchangeable triangular arrays. We refer to Billingsley [1968] for the theory of weak
convergence of probability measures.
Let Y, Z be Polish spaces. For n ∈ N, let Yn, Zn be random variables on (Ωn,Fn,Pn)
with values in Y and Z, respectively.
Lemma A.1. Let Ψ : Z → Y be measurable. Suppose that (Yn, Zn) converges in dis-
tribution to (Y,Z) as n→∞ for some Y × Z-valued random variable (Y,Z) defined on
(Ω,F ,P).
If Yn = Ψ(Zn) Pn-almost surely for every n ∈ N and if Ψ is continuous P ◦Z
−1-
almost everywhere, then Y = Ψ(Z) P-almost surely.
Proof. The hypothesis that Ψ is continuous P ◦Z−1-almost everywhere implies that the
mapping Y × Z ∋ (y, z) 7→ (y,Ψ(z)) is continuous P ◦(Y,Z)−1-almost everywhere. By
the convergence assumption and the mapping theorem Billingsley [1968, Theorem I.5.1],
it follows that
(Yn,Ψ(Zn))
n→∞
−→ (Y,Ψ(Z)) in distribution.
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Let D
.
= {(y, y˜) ∈ Y × Y : y = y˜} be the diagonal in Y × Y. Then D is closed in Y × Y,
hence
lim sup
n→∞
Pn ((Yn,Ψ(Zn)) ∈ D) ≤ P ((Y,Ψ(Z)) ∈ D)
by the Portmanteau theorem [Billingsley, 1968, Theorem I.2.1]. On the other hand, we
have Pn ((Yn,Ψ(Zn)) ∈ D) = 1 for every n ∈ N since Yn = Ψ(Zn) Pn-almost surely
by hypothesis. It follows that P ((Y,Ψ(Z)) ∈ D) = 1, that is, Y = Ψ(Z) P-almost
surely.
Lemma A.2. Let dZ be a metric compatible with the topology of Z. Suppose that (Yn, Zn)
converges in distribution to (Y,Z) as n → ∞ for some Y × Z-valued random variable
(Y,Z) defined on (Ω,F ,P). Let (Z˜n)n∈N be a sequence of Z-valued random variables
with Z˜n defined on (Ωn,Fn,Pn) such that
En
[
dZ(Zn, Z˜n)
]
n→∞
−→ 0.
Then (Yn, Z˜n) converges in distribution to (Y,Z) as n→∞.
Proof. Let dY be any metric compatible with the topology of Y. Set
d ((y, z), (y˜, z˜))
.
= dY(y, y˜) + dZ(z, z˜), (y, z), (y˜, z˜) ∈ Y × Z.
Then d is a metric on Y × Z compatible with the product topology. By hypothesis
and Markov’s inequality, we have that (d((Yn, Zn), (Yn, Z˜n)))n∈N converges to zero in
probability. As the limit is a constant, this is equivalent to convergence in distribution,
and the underlying probability spaces may depend on n ∈ N. The assertion now follows
from Theorem I.4.1 in Billingsley [1968, p. 25].
For the next result, let κn be a regular conditional distribution of Yn given the σ-
algebra generated by Zn, each n ∈ N. Thus, κn is a mapping Ωn × B(Y) → [0, 1] that
induces a P(Y)-valued random variable and is such that, for every A ∈ B(Y),
Pn (Yn ∈ A | Zn) = κn(A) Pn -almost surely.
A regular conditional distribution of Yn given Zn exists since Y is a Polish space, and it is
uniquely determined with probability one when seen as a P(Y)-valued random variable.
Lemma A.3. Let κn be a regular conditional distribution of Yn given σ(Zn) as above.
Suppose that (Yn, Zn, κn) converges in distribution to (Y,Z, κ) as n→∞ for some Y×Z×
P(Y)-valued random variable (Y,Z, κ) defined on (Ω,F ,P). Then, for every A ∈ B(Y),
every B ∈ B(Z),
P (Y ∈ A,Z ∈ B) = E [1B(Z) · κ(A)] .
If, in addition, κ(A) is σ(Z)-measurable for every A ∈ B(Y), then κ is a regular condi-
tional distribution of Y given σ(Z).
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Proof. Let Q ∈ P(Y ×Z) be the joint law of Y and Z: Q
.
= P ◦(Y,Z)−1. Define another
measure Q˜ ∈ P(Y × Z) by setting, for A ∈ B(Y), B ∈ B(Z),
Q˜(A×B)
.
= E [1B(Z) · κ(A)] .
Let g : Y × Z → R be bounded and measurable. Then, for every n ∈ N,
En [g(Yn, Zn)] = En
[∫
Y
g(y, Zn)κn(dy)
]
,
since κn is a version of the regular conditional distribution of Yn given σ(Zn) by hypoth-
esis. If g is bounded and continuous, then, by convergence in distribution of (Yn, Zn) to
(Y,Z),
lim
n→∞
En [g(Yn, Zn)] = E [g(Y,Z)] ,
but also, by convergence in distribution of (Zn, κn) to (Z, κ),
lim
n→∞
En
[∫
Y
g(y, Zn)κn(dy)
]
= E
[∫
Y
g(y, Z)κ(dy)
]
since the mapping (z,m) 7→
∫
Y g(y, z)m(dy) is bounded and continuous on Z × P(Y) if
g is bounded and continuous on Y × Z; cf. Theorem I.5.5 in Billingsley [1968, p. 34].
Therefore, for every g : Y × Z → R bounded and continuous,∫
Y×Z
g dQ = E [g(Y,Z)] = E
[∫
Y
g(y, Z)κ(dy)
]
=
∫
Y×Z
g dQ˜.
A measure on the Borel sets of a Polish space is uniquely determined by its integrals over
all bounded continuous functions. It follows that Q = Q˜. This in turn implies that for
all A ∈ B(Y), all B ∈ B(Z),
E [1A(Y ) · 1B(Z)] = E [1B(Z) · κ(A)] ,
which yields the first part of the assertion. If, in addition, κ(A) is σ(Z)-measurable for
every A ∈ B(Y), then
P (Y ∈ A | Z) = κ(A) P -almost surely
by the above property and the definition of conditional expectation.
Lemma A.4. Let Y and κ be random variables on some probability space (Ω,F ,P)
with values in Y and P(Y), respectively. Let C, G, C˜ be sub-σ-algebras of F such that
C ⊆ G ⊆ C˜.
If κ is a regular conditional distribution of Y given C as well as given C˜, then κ is
also a regular conditional distribution of Y given G.
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Proof. Suppose that κ is a regular conditional distribution of Y given C as well as given
C˜. Let A ∈ B(Y). The first part of the assumption implies that κ(A) is C-measurable,
hence also G-measurable (since C ⊆ G). The second part of the assumption entails that
P ({Y ∈ A} ∩ C) = E [1C · κ(A)]
for all C ∈ C˜, hence also for all C ∈ G (since G ⊆ C˜). This shows that κ is a regular
conditional distribution of Y given G.
The next result recalls the conditional distribution of an element of a finite exchange-
able sequence given the associated empirical measure.
Lemma A.5. Let Y1, . . . , YN be a finite exchangeable sequence of Y-valued random vari-
ables on some probability space (Ω,F ,P), and let
µNω
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δYi(ω), ω ∈ Ω,
be the associated empirical measure. Then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
P
(
Yi ∈ . | µ
N
)
= µN (.)
in the sense that µN is a regular conditional distribution of Yi given (the σ-algebra gen-
erated by) µN .
Proof. The assertion follows from Lemma 11.11 in Kallenberg [2001, p. 213].
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